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Abstract
Background—The potential risks associated with “toilet plume” aerosols produced by flush 
toilets is a subject of continuing study. This review examines the evidence regarding toilet plume 
bioaerosol generation and infectious disease transmission.
Methods—The peer-reviewed scientific literature was searched to identify articles related to 
aerosol production during toilet flushing, as well as epidemiologic studies examining the potential 
role of toilets in infectious disease outbreaks.
Results—The studies demonstrate that potentially infectious aerosols may be produced in 
substantial quantities during flushing. Aerosolization can continue through multiple flushes to 
expose subsequent toilet users. Some of the aerosols desiccate to become droplet nuclei and 
remain adrift in the air currents. However, no studies have yet clearly demonstrated or refuted 
toilet plume-related disease transmission, and the significance of the risk remains largely 
uncharacterized.
Conclusion—Research suggests that toilet plume could play a contributory role in the 
transmission of infectious diseases. Additional research in multiple areas is warranted to assess the 
risks posed by toilet plume, especially within health care facilities.
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An association between inhalable bioaerosols produced from disturbed sewage and the 
transmission of infectious disease has been proposed for over 100 years. However, little 
study has been devoted to characterizing the potential risks posed by the “toilet plume” 
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aerosols created by toilet flushing. We summarize the related scientific literature and 
identify gaps in the knowledge base, addressing the following questions: (1) “Do flush 
toilets produce potentially infectious aerosols?” (2) “Do toilet plume aerosols pose a risk for 
the spread of infectious disease?” and (3) “What future research is needed to further 
characterize the risks of exposure to toilet plume aerosols within a health care setting?”
DO FLUSH TOILETS PRODUCE POTENTIALLY INFECTIOUS AEROSOLS?
The potential for airborne transmission of sewage-related infectious disease was 
demonstrated by Horrocks over 100 years ago1 when he cultured airborne microorganisms 
from sewage drain systems and also detected airborne transport from one hospital building 
to another via the sewer drains. Similar results were seen by others including Andrewes.2
Bioaerosol production during toilet flushing was first reported in the 1950s by Jessen,3 who 
“seeded” several types of toilets with Serratia marcescens (then termed Bacillus 
prodigiosus) and measured bioaerosols produced by flushing. Agar-filled “settle plates” 
caught bioaerosols that fell out of the air because of gravity, and a Bourdillon slit impactor4 
collected air samples. Cistern-fed, gravity-flow toilets and a mains-fed pressure-valve toilet 
were examined. In addition to colonies found on the floor-based settle plates, microbes were 
still being captured from the air 8 minutes after the flush, indicating collection of “droplet 
nuclei” bioaerosols. Droplet nuclei are the tiny particles that remain after the water in a 
droplet evaporates. They have negligible settling velocity and will float with natural air 
currents.5 Jessen observed that the amount of bioaerosol increased with increasing flush 
energy.3
Darlow and Bale6 seeded a “wash-down” type toilet with S marcescens and sampled air 
above the toilet with liquid impingers and a Bourdillon impactor. A wash-down toilet 
releases the flush water from the toilet rim where it flows down the bowl walls and washes 
the waste into the S-shaped exit trapway.7 Bioaerosol was detected in samples collected 
above the toilet 5 to 7 minutes after the flush, indicating droplet nuclei bioaerosol. Despite 
over 99% reductions in bowl water microbial concentrations with each flush, air samples 
indicated only 50% to 60% bioaerosol reductions. They concluded that this was at least 
partially attributable to a reduction in the number of bacteria per droplet rather than a 
reduction in the number of droplets containing bacteria because both a multi-organism 
droplet and a single-organism droplet would appear as 1 colony when deposited on an 
impactor agar plate.
Siphonic toilets, which feature a submerged jet that propels the waste into the trapway to 
initiate a siphon action that clears the waste, have generally replaced wash-down models. 
Bound and Atkinson8 found that the higher energy siphonic toilet produced approximately 
1/14th as much bioaerosol as the wash-down design for the same flush volume. Newsom 
also demonstrated higher bioaerosol production with higher flush energy when he compared 
high and low cistern toilets seeded with homogenized feces or suspensions of various 
bacteria.9
Gerba et al10 seeded a siphonic gravity-flow toilet with Escherichia coli and sequentially 
placed 3 arrays of settle plates on the floor around the toilet, with each set exposed for 2 
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hours. For the first sample set (0–2 hours), cultured bacteria were predominantly from plates 
near the toilet, whereas, in later sample sets (2–4 and 4–6 hours), the positive plates were 
more randomly distributed around the room. This was consistent with an initial deposition of 
large droplets close to the toilet immediately after the flush, followed by dispersion and 
mixing of the droplet nuclei into the air with delayed deposition throughout the room. The E 
coli bioaerosol remained airborne and viable for at least 4 to 6 hours postflush.
Barker and Bloomfield11 seeded a gravity-flow toilet with Salmonella enteritidis PT4 and 
collected surface wipe and air samples after flushing. They observed contamination of the 
toilet seat and the underside of the lid and also cultured Salmonella from the air sample. 
They detected Salmonella in the bowl water after 12 days and in biofilm below the bowl 
waterline for 50 days after seeding, which suggested a possible role of biofilm as a long-
term reservoir and active source of pathogenic organisms in the bowl water.
Barker and Jones seeded a toilet with S marcescens or MS2 bacteriophage.12 Air samples 
were collected in front of and above the toilet seat with the toilet seat lid open. They also 
exposed settle plates at 5 locations around the toilet, including 2 above and behind the seat. 
Bioaerosols were present up to 60 minutes after flushing, and all settle plates were positive 
for all test conditions and sampling locations, demonstrating droplet nuclei bioaerosol. They 
also examined toilet bowl clearance and bioaerosol production during sequential flushes 
without reseeding, with results similar to those of Darlow and Bale,6 Newsom,9 and Gerba 
et al10 in that bioaerosol concentration did not decrease in proportion to bowl water 
concentration.
Recently, Best et al13 flushed a toilet seeded with fecal suspensions of Clostridium difficile. 
Settle plates were placed near the toilet and air was sampled at seat height, flush handle 
height, and midway in-between, with the toilet lid both up and down. Settle plates showed 
widespread dissemination of large droplets with the lid up but not with the lid down. C 
difficile was recovered from air sampled at heights up to 25 cm above the toilet seat and up 
to 90 minutes after flushing, at concentrations 12-fold greater with the lid up than with the 
lid down. They concluded that lidless conventional toilets increase the risk of C difficile 
environmental contamination and thus discouraged their use. In the United States, however, 
this would contradict current Uniform Plumbing Code specifications regarding toilet seat 
design and the installation of toilet seat lids on health care and other public facility “water 
closets”14 as well as similar requirements for gap-front seats without cover for water closets 
in the US Veterans Administration specifications often cited for health care facility design.15
It may be concluded from the above that flush toilets produce substantial quantities of toilet 
plume aerosol capable of entraining microorganisms at least as large as bacteria, that 
sufficiently small microbe-laden droplets will evaporate to form droplet nuclei bioaerosols 
small enough to be inhaled deep into the lung, and that these bioaerosols may remain viable 
in the air for extended periods and travel with air currents. Production of these bioaerosols 
during multiple flushes after contamination suggests a long-term potential for a 
contaminated toilet to be an infectious bioaerosol generator.
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DOES TOILET PLUME POSE A RISK FOR THE SPREAD OF INFECTIOUS 
DISEASE?
Contact transmission risk because of surface contamination by flush droplets
A number of studies have demonstrated the contamination of toilet seats and lids, the 
surrounding floors, and the nearby surfaces by toilet flush aerosols.3,6,9,10,12,13,16 Because 
both the vomit and feces of infected persons may contain extremely high pathogen 
concentrations, eg, 105 to 109 Shigella,17 104 to 108 Salmonella,17 and 108 to 109 
norovirus18 per gram of stool and at least 106 norovirus per milliliter of vomit,19 some 
fraction of the aerosol droplets produced during toilet flushing may be expected to contain 
microbes.20
A critical determinant of the infection risk posed by a deposited pathogen will be the 
organism’s ability to survive on a surface.21 Many pathogens, including Shigella, E coli, C 
difficile, severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) coronavirus, and norovirus can survive 
on surfaces for weeks or even months.22 These pathogens can also be present in vomit or 
stools of infected persons.
In 1956, Hutchinson associated the transmission of Sonne dysentery with Shigella 
contamination on toilet seats,23 and a number of subsequent field studies have detected 
contamination on toilet seats and surrounding surfaces with fecal organisms.9,11,24,25 
Thorough cleaning and disinfection of environmental surfaces in health care facilities is a 
foundational component of infection control programs,26 and disinfection is particularly 
important because many studies have shown that microbial surface contamination (including 
C difficile, vancomycin-resistant Enterococcus, and methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus 
aureus [MRSA]) may persist even after cleaning.27–29 The limits of environmental cleaning 
in preventing spread of viral disease are apparent with acute gastroenteritis (AGE). AGE is 
frequently caused by norovirus, and the diarrhea and vomiting typically associated with 
AGE as well as the high viral loads in both stools and vomit suggest a likely toilet role in 
disease transmission. Environmental contamination has been shown to be a major source of 
AGE infection on ships,30–35 including during sequential voyages of a cruise ship in spite of 
aggressive sanitation efforts and a documented history of good Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention (CDC) Vessel Sanitation Program inspection scores.34 This may be due in 
part to the ability of toilets to continue generating contaminated toilet plume during multiple 
flushes after original contamination as well as the apparent resistance of norovirus36 and 
perhaps other viruses to cleaning and disinfection. Gerba et al observed that MS2 
bacteriophage and poliovirus were not completely cleared from a toilet even after 7 flushes 
and that scrubbing with or without addition of a surfactant to the water was only minimally 
effective in eliminating these residual organisms.10 The manner in which cleaning and 
disinfection is performed is also important in ensuring complete disinfection of surfaces, 
especially when surfaces are heavily contaminated.37
Airborne transmission risk because of toilet plume droplet nuclei
Although Chapin dismissed the airborne route as unimportant in his 1912 review of 
infectious disease transmission,38 by the 1960s it was accepted that droplet nuclei microbial 
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aerosols were important in the transmission of many infectious diseases in both indoor and 
outdoor environments.39,40 We now understand that whether pathogenic droplet nuclei 
bioaerosols actually cause infection and disease will depend on numerous factors including 
the organism’s viability under existing environmental conditions, the size and chemical 
composition of the droplet nuclei matrix, the number of organisms inhaled and their 
virulence, and the exposed person’s immune status.40
A number of diseases are known or suspected to be transmissible by the airborne route. 
However, most are either not transmissible from human to human or are not present in feces 
or vomit and so are not relevant to the present discussion. Toilet-related pathogens that are 
of interest include those causing gastroenteritis, and a number of gastroenteritis-causing 
bacteria, protozoa, and especially viruses will be shed in stool and vomit. Giardia and 
Cryptosporidium protozoa may be present in feces, have low infective dose, and are stable 
in the environment, but aerosolization of oocyst-containing droplet nuclei has not been 
documented.41 Gram-negative bacteria, with the notable exception of Legionella, are 
susceptible to drying and do not usually spread by the airborne route. The gram-positive 
MRSA is an airborne nosocomial infection concern,42 but the potential for toilet plume 
bioaerosols to cause nosocomial MRSA infection has not yet been assessed.
Mycobacterium tuberculosis (TB) appears to be most efficiently transmitted via droplet 
nuclei43 and is an occupational hazard to health care workers as well as a nosocomial 
infection hazard to patients.44 TB affects primarily the lungs, but TB bacilli can also be 
swallowed in sputum to infect the gastrointestinal (GI) tract.45 At least 21% of 2009 US TB 
cases involved this “extrapulmonary” infection including infection of the GI tract,46 
although perhaps less than 5% of all TB cases involve lower GI tract infection.45 The bacilli 
can survive intestinal transit to be shed in stool,47,48 and, because one of the symptoms of GI 
TB is diarrhea,45 there appears to be a possibility of aerosolizing infectious TB droplet 
nuclei in toilet flush aerosol. M tuberculosis is a lipid-rich, hydrophobic bacterium, and 
hydrophobic bacteria have been shown to concentrate on the surface of aqueous 
suspensions49,50 and to be aerosolized with even slight disturbance of liquid surfaces.51,52
The most significant toilet plume airborne infection risks are likely to be due to viruses, and 
perhaps the most significant of these is norovirus. Norovirus accounts for 73% to 95% of 
nonbacterial gastroenteritis outbreaks and half of all gastroenteritis outbreaks, worldwide.53 
It may also be transmitted in aerosol and has a low infectious dose.54 It is shed both before 
and after—sometimes long after—the symptomatic phase of infection, is resistant to 
inactivation, and can persist on environmental surfaces for extended periods.55–57 Diarrhea 
and vomiting are both common with norovirus AGE, so both the use of toilets by infected 
persons and the toilet disposal of feces or vomit by other persons could produce norovirus 
bioaerosols.
Another important viral pathogen is the SARS coronavirus (SARS CoV), which is known to 
be shed in both feces58–60 and vomit.60 A number of studies (discussed below) have 
suggested that it can be spread by the airborne route,61–64 and, although not presently a 
common disease, it has demonstrated its potential for explosive spread and high mortality.
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Novel influenza A virus H1N1 has also demonstrated some important epidemiologic 
features that indicate a potential for airborne transmission via toilet plume. Seasonal 
influenza does not normally present with diarrhea or vomiting, but each had a prevalence of 
25% in the first 642 US cases65 and 17% and 22%, respectively, among the first 938 US 
cases66 diagnosed during the 2009 pandemic H1N1 influenza outbreak. It has been 
measured in respirable-size aerosol in health care and other facilities,67,68 has been detected 
in both stools and urine of H1N1 patients even in the absence of significant GI symptoms,69 
and has shown a potential for extended virus shedding in stool.70 The presence of H1N1 in 
vomit seems likely, and, although no report documenting this was found, a suggestive study 
by Papenburg et al noted that the likelihood of H1N1 transmission in a household was 
greatest for patients with both diarrhea and vomiting.71
Epidemiologic studies of disease outbreaks possibly related to toilet plume
Widdowson et al investigated AGE among passengers on an 8-hour international flight72 on 
which 8 of 14 flight crew members experienced vomiting and diarrhea. No episodes of 
diarrhea or vomiting occurred outside of a restroom, and there were no reported indications 
of restroom soiling with vomit or feces. Passengers who developed probable norovirus 
illness 18 to 60 hours after disembarkation were found to have visited a restroom 
significantly more often than noncases. The authors concluded that “inapparent 
environmental contamination” may have been an exposure source.
Ho et al studied an outbreak of viral AGE during a transatlantic passenger ship voyage.73 
They compared disease frequency in cabins varying from 1 to 4 occupants either having or 
not having a private bathroom and showed an increasing AGE risk with increasing number 
of occupants where a private bathroom was available as compared with cabins where one 
was not available. AGE incidence among those using communal bathrooms correlated 
significantly with the bathroom usage density. It was also shown that, in cabins with 
multiple occupants, the risk of a second person developing disease was higher in cabins 
where the first person had vomited, even though none of the subsequent cases either assisted 
the ill person or cleaned up the vomit. Presence in the room when vomiting actually 
occurred also did not appear to matter. The authors concluded that person-to-person and 
aerosol routes were the likely modes of transmission, with vomit being implicated as a 
source, and suggested that contact spread was facilitated by contaminated communal 
bathrooms.
Marks et al74 studied restaurant diners who developed AGE following nonprojectile 
vomiting by the source diner and showed a pattern of decreasing attack rate with increasing 
distance from the source: 91% at the source’s table; 71% and 56% at the 2 adjacent tables, 
respectively; and lower rates farther away. This study strongly implicated airborne norovirus 
transmission by vomit aerosol and thus the likelihood of airborne transmissibility by toilet 
plume aerosol contaminated with vomit.
Epidemiologic, experimental, and modeling studies of SARS are among the most 
compelling indicators of the potential for toilet plume to cause airborne disease 
transmission. A report on the 2003 SARS outbreak in Hong Kong’s Amoy Gardens 
apartment complex concluded that exposure and disease propagation was likely due to virus-
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laden aerosols originating in the sanitary system.64 The system was contaminated with 
SARS CoV when the index patient, who was suffering from diarrhea, visited one of the 
apartments and used the toilet. Sewer drain bioaerosol was believed to be drawn through dry 
floor drain U-tube traps into the bathrooms of other apartments by bathroom exhaust fans, 
and some may have then been exhausted to the outside of the multistory building and carried 
upward to other apartments. Prevailing winds were thought to be responsible for carrying 
the infectious aerosol to nearby buildings where cases also occurred.63,75 These studies 
suggest that SARS CoV droplet nuclei bioaerosols produced from contaminated sewage may 
have been highly infectious for significant periods and over long distances. Because the 
infectious waste, whether feces or vomit, is most concentrated in the toilet bowl and 
substantial quantities of aerosol are known to be produced during flushing, it might 
reasonably be expected that infectious SARS CoV droplet nuclei bioaerosol would also be 
produced during toilet flushing. To date, however, this has not been either experimentally or 
epidemiologically demonstrated.
No epidemiologic studies of the 2009 H1N1 pandemic have conclusively shown airborne 
transmission via droplet nuclei, and the primary transmission mode is still considered to be 
by contact with large particle respiratory droplets or contaminated surfaces.76 Studies 
involving confined environment exposures in aircraft and buses concluded that the airborne 
route did not appear to be an important transmission mode,77–80 in contrast to the high 
influenza transmission rate observed on an older aircraft with poor ventilation.81 Although 
these epidemiologic studies have not demonstrated airborne infection, 2 recent 
environmental studies measured influenza A virus in respirable size aerosols collected in 
health care facilities, day care centers, and aircraft.67,68 This finding, the shedding of 
influenza virus in stool and perhaps vomit, and the prevalence of diarrhea and vomiting in 
Novel H1N1 patients encourage exploration of the potential for toilet plume to contain 
infectious virus-containing droplet nuclei aerosols.
WHAT FUTURE RESEARCH IS NEEDED TO FURTHER CHARACTERIZE 
THE RISKS OF EXPOSURE TO TOILET PLUME?
Epidemiologic and laboratory studies provide evidence that potentially infectious aerosols 
may be produced during flushing of toilets contaminated with vomit or diarrhea from 
infected persons. Further assessment of the airborne infection risk requires research to 
address the following questions: (1) What are the physical properties of toilet plume? (2) 
How much toilet plume is produced, and which toilet design or operating characteristics 
most influence aerosol production? (3) How persistent are flush-generated droplet nuclei 
bioaerosols in the air? (4) Can infection be transmitted by toilet flush droplet nuclei 
bioaerosols, and, if so, what are the airborne concentrations and dispersion patterns of flush-
generated pathogenic droplet nuclei bioaerosols in health care environments? (5) What 
interventions or practices might prove effective in controlling toilet plume bioaerosols?
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Contaminated toilets have been clearly shown to produce large droplet and droplet nuclei 
bioaerosols during flushing, and research suggests that this toilet plume could play an 
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important role in the transmission of infectious diseases for which the pathogen is shed in 
feces or vomit. The possible role of toilet plume in airborne transmission of norovirus, 
SARS, and pandemic influenza is of particular interest. Additional research is needed to 
assess the exposure risk posed by toilet flush bioaerosols in health care facilities.
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